“Free trade is the sensible rule of thumb most of the time in most sectors. It is sensible because the efficiency gains are often real, even if the theory of comparative advantage over-generalizes them; and it is a simpler rule for any state and for inter-state agreements than rules for managed trade. But the argument…about production and employment, in the context of economic growth rather than static resource efficiency, suggests that inter-state agreements, including the rules of the WTO, should be revised to permit more government “leadership” and “followership” of the market – sometimes by leading the production structure into activities the private sector would not undertake on its own, sometimes by making bets on initiatives already underway in the private sector to assist those initiatives to scale up. This contrasts with the current situation, in which the WTO restricts the use of instruments relevant to developing countries’ efforts to upgrade the national production structure – including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and direct industry subsidies – while allowing instruments relevant to advanced countries’ efforts to grow new activities on the world frontier, such as R&D subsidies. The WTO is, put crudely, an industrial upgrading device for advanced countries, an industrial downgrading device for developing countries. President Trump surely does not intend his skepticism of free trade to benefit developing countries, but it gives the potential for others to modify international rules towards more “policy space””.
Robert H. Wade (2017), Is Trump wrong on trade? A partial defense based on production and employment, in E. Fullbrook and J. Morgan (eds.), Trumponomics – Causes and Consequences, College Publications and World Economic Association, p.97
The full article can be viewed for free here.
In a number of previous posts on development and industrial policy, I have mentioned the concept of ‘catch-up’. I thought it might be useful to define it in some detail, so here is Akira Suehiro of the University of Tokyo, taken from his comprehensive work Catch-Up Industrialization (2008, p.3-4):
“Catch-up industrialization is a pattern of industrialization frequently, indeed necessarily, adopted by late-industrializing countries and late-starting industries. It is an essential aspect of any attempt to reduce the gap in national wealth between developing and developed countries.
The many varieties of catch-up industrialization generally have the following two points in common.
First, latecomers to industrialization enjoy the advantages of “economic backwardness”, or the advantage of being able to make use of technologies and knowledge systems developed by countries that have gone before. It is expensive and time-consuming for any country to independently develop new technologies and products, not to mention new industrial structures or management organizations. Latecomer countries can achieve great savings of time and capital by adopting the necessary technology and know-how from countries that have already industrialized.
It follows that an important challenge for governments and enterprises in latecomer countries is how to go about importing, adapting, and improving foreign technologies and systems as smoothly as possible. From this fact of life stem many of the most striking features of catch-up industrialization: strong government leadership, positive involvement by financial institutions (with corporate finance through commercial banks rather than stock-markets), development of information-sharing systems between government and private sector and between assemblers and suppliers (intermediate organizations, keiretsu, etc.), the continuation of family businesses such as zaibatsu in corporate management, and the development of distinctive production management control systems in the workplace (the kaizen and just-in-time systems, workers’ commitment to management, etc.).
The second common feature among latecomers to industrialization is that they have to start by importing most industrial products. For some time they have to earn the foreign currency to pay for these imports through exports of primary products such as mineral and agricultural products. In order to reduce imports, the latecomer countries launch a policy of domestic production and import substitution, starting with relatively low-tech, labor-intensive industries. Consider, for instance, the case of textile products. If a country has just commenced domestic production of synthetic fiber products, that necessitates imports of the chemical raw materials, plus the machinery and equipment to process them. The country has to export textile products to get the necessary foreign currency for these imports, while also commencing production of chemical products and machinery at home.
A cycle consequently develops: from importing to domestic production, then to exporting (or overseas production), then to re-importing. At the same time it is important to establish a trade policy centered on import substitution and export promotion, and an industrial policy aimed at the protection and fostering of domestic industries. In short, trade and industry are inextricably interlinked. It follows that under the conditions of this first phase, with its dependence on imports and its need to conserve limited supplies of foreign currency, an important challenge for those who would catch up is the effective distribution and control of available economic resources. This means that a set of policy structures – regulations on trade, tariffs and investment, export-led industrialization, tie-ups with foreign capital to foster export-oriented industries, etc. – constitute another feature of catch-up industrialization.”
I recently bought a new sun hat (stay with me). A label inside reads ‘made in China’. Replacing my previous hat was well overdue, as it was more than 20 years old. Out of curiosity and before getting rid of it, I checked inside and saw a label, which also read ‘made in China’. I must be something of a geek, as this got me thinking about the manufacture of clothing and development processes.
It is notable that China is manufacturing and exporting clothing such as this, just as it was twenty years ago. The hats are not dissimilar. Of course, the Chinese economy is the largest manufacturing nation in the world and exports a huge amount of goods of all kinds. But according to this experience, companies there are still involved in the manufacture of quite basic clothing. Continue reading
Democracy, accountable and transparent government, low levels of corruption, the rule of law, stable property rights, pluralism: we tend to think that these are all highly desirable in any society.
In poor countries, they are often absent, but at least some of them are present in many rich ones. It seems to follow that they should be encouraged in the former as a way to encourage development. After all, if richer countries have these characteristics, they may be part of the development process.
This wishful thinking provides a foundation for the ‘good governance’ agenda propagated by the World Bank and other international institutions during the 1990s and into the 2000s. It was argued that domestic political reforms in the direction of good governance in poor countries would provide the institutional environment conducive to the efficient working of markets and thereby promote development. Continue reading
This post summarises some of the ideas in an interesting article from the May issue of the Cambridge Journal of Economics. The piece shows that an analysis of ‘complex networks’ using ‘big data’ lends support to structuralist arguments about growth and development. I briefly discuss the implications for industrial policies intended to promote the ‘catching up’ of poor countries with richer ones.
The Cambridge Journal of Economics (CJE) is an influential heterodox journal published six times a year. It includes as one of its patrons nobel prize-winner Amartya Sen and as associate editors Ha-Joon Chang, Mushtaq Khan and Anwar Shaikh, whose ideas I have sometimes discussed in previous posts.
As CJE articles are usually behind a paywall, I thought it would be helpful to summarise and comment on one or two when they are interesting and relevant to this blog. Continue reading
2018 marks 24 years since I first took an interest in what is sometimes referred to as the ‘dismal science’. Not a particularly notable landmark, though it is more than half my life. And I certainly have not spent all that time with my nose in books about economics, although I have spent quite a bit of it like that, maybe more than is good for me.
Apparently it was the Victorian historian Thomas Carlyle who coined the phrase dismal science in the 19th century. I am sometimes inclined to agree, when observing a malfunctioning economy and its malfunctioning stewards in government and business. But more often I am prepared to be optimistic that we can find solutions to the problems of humanity. Some of them might even come from studying economics!
Keynes looked forward to a time when the economist’s role in society would be akin to that of dentists, as humble, competent fixers of minor problems. Notwithstanding a call from the UK’s current environment secretary during the campaign for Brexit to pay less attention to experts, economists and their ideological categories of supply, demand and growth have become extremely powerful and accepted, even if with passivity, resignation or incomprehension. Continue reading
In Tuesday’s post on China’s industrial policy I mentioned the country’s lack of enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) as a feature of its development. The US in particular, but also other rich countries, have complained about this for many years.
IPR policy, such as the creation of patents, is intended to encourage innovation by allowing firms to reap profits from the creation of new knowledge and therefore provide them with incentives to innovate. This sounds like a good thing. But managing an IPR regime requires careful judgement. If new ideas are protected for only a short period, firms may not have sufficient monetary incentives to innovate; if they are protected for too long, competition will be stifled and the diffusion of the innovation across the relevant sector or economy, as rival firms compete for a share of the market by copying or adapting it, will be slowed.
Badly designed IPR regimes can therefore slow growth in economy-wide productivity. Innovating firms often have an incentive to lobby policymakers to introduce lengthy and comprehensive patent protection, to their benefit, but to the detriment of the economy and society as a whole. Continue reading