Despite a brief revival, the world economy is slowing again. A more sustained recovery will require international cooperation to reduce external imbalances in a way that reduces unemployment and maintains low inflation.
This post explores the role of the role of internal and external balance (or lack thereof) in helping us find a return to a more sustainable prosperity. These ideas form much of the theoretical content of The Leaderless Economy by Peter Temin and David Vines, which was published in 2013.
So do we need another policy scheme for restoring global prosperity? I would argue that we do. Global growth picked up in 2017 but, apart perhaps from the US, has begun to falter recently, not least in the UK, but also in continental Europe. Many economies have accumulated high levels of private and public debt, and have made little progress in reducing them. Continue reading →
More thought-provoking words from Michael Pettis on global economics and politics, particularly the relationship between the US and China, the pressures on international trading relationships and the two countries’ roles in future decades.
He describes the options open to the dominant global powers in restoring a more sustained pattern of growth and prosperity: one country can lead, or we can all get together and cooperate over economic policy.
He suggests that we are living through a period during which neither are likely. Furthermore, the experience of the 1920s and 30s demonstrate that this power vacuum could be bad for us all.
The BBC reported on Tuesday that government borrowing for the 2017-18 financial year fell to its lowest level in eleven years, at £42.6bn. This was lower than forecast and represents 2.1% of GDP. However much of this reduction is accounted for by reduced spending rather than increased tax revenue. This is because economic growth remains sluggish, at 0.1% in the first quarter of 2018 according to the latest figures, and is failing to generate buoyant tax receipts.
So austerity continues, while growth is faltering. The Chancellor, Philip Hammond, claimed today that “our economy is strong and we have made significant progress.” This is surely breathtaking arrogance. The deficit may be down, but the economy is struggling.
According to economist and entrepreneur John Mills, the UK economy could be doing much better and significant imbalances remain, which are constraining growth and improvements in productivity and wages. Continue reading →
Last year the UK government published its industrial strategy, which, broadly speaking, aims to improve the country’s economic performance, from productivity and wage growth to job creation and regional imbalances.
This strategy, which seems to consciously avoid the more traditional term, ‘industrial policy’, is welcome. But does it go far enough, and what of importance is missing from the strategy?
There are some significant blind spots in the new strategy. One of the most glaring is the neglect of macroeconomics and the level of the exchange rate. Another is, remarkably, the neglect of the manufacturing sector itself, and a necessary focus on reindustrialisation. Continue reading →
Almog Adir and Simon Whitaker In the last few years there has been a small net overall flow of capital from advanced to emerging market economies (EMEs), in contrast to the ‘paradox’ prevailing for much of this century of capital flowing the ‘wrong’ way, uphill from poor to rich countries. In this post we show […]
Yanis Varoufakis is a self-styled ‘erratic Marxist’ and a former finance minister of Greece under the Syriza-led government. He penned his illuminating book The Global Minotaur (TGM) some years ago, in the aftermath of the evolving Global Financial Crisis.
He has become a prolific writer for the intelligent layman, and his website is well worth a look, particularly for those interested in progressive reform in the European Union and the Eurozone.
TGM is Varoufakis’ thesis on the roots of the crisis, which according to him lie back in the 1940s, towards the end of World War II. At that time, the US had emerged as the global capitalist hegemon, economically, politically and militarily.
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire was attended by such figures as the economist John Maynard Keynes, who led the British delegation, and Harry Dexter White, his US counterpart. The aim was to construct a post-war global economic and financial order which would avoid another Great Depression, as had occurred in the 1930s, and the achievement of peace and prosperity via international cooperation. Continue reading →
This surplus, which means that Germany is lending its equivalent abroad, is equal to the excess of national saving over national investment.
It means that the rest of the world is running a current account deficit with Germany, since the sum of all the world’s current account surpluses and deficits is zero. If the rest of the world is running an overall deficit with Germany, this means that it is accumulating debt, funded by Germany lending its net savings, or the savings that are not invested domestically.
I have discussed these matters in previous posts, but the article cited above makes a useful point. The potential for reducing the German current account surplus is being played out as a conflict between economic and institutional forces. Continue reading →