Tracing a connection between rising inequality and the Great Recession of 2008 is appealing to leftist economists. It suggests that what they see as two of the potential downsides of capitalism and in particular the neoliberal economic order can perhaps be mitigated via appropriate policies. Thus, a more egalitarian capitalism can become less prone to crisis or recession.
Of course, what is appealing as social and economic outcomes is not a good enough reason to investigate linkages between them, though I suspect that I am far from the only one who is drawn to particular ideas as a matter of bias.
Perhaps there is nothing wrong with that as a starting point, followed by economic analysis of the chosen object of study.
These three countries had the largest current account imbalances in absolute terms in the run-up to the recession. The US ran a deficit, and Germany and China were running surpluses. Since these imbalances have been pinpointed by some economists as a cause of the recession itself, analysing them is important. Continue reading →
Last year the UK government published its industrial strategy, which, broadly speaking, aims to improve the country’s economic performance, from productivity and wage growth to job creation and regional imbalances.
This strategy, which seems to consciously avoid the more traditional term, ‘industrial policy’, is welcome. But does it go far enough, and what of importance is missing from the strategy?
There are some significant blind spots in the new strategy. One of the most glaring is the neglect of macroeconomics and the level of the exchange rate. Another is, remarkably, the neglect of the manufacturing sector itself, and a necessary focus on reindustrialisation. Continue reading →
Almog Adir and Simon Whitaker In the last few years there has been a small net overall flow of capital from advanced to emerging market economies (EMEs), in contrast to the ‘paradox’ prevailing for much of this century of capital flowing the ‘wrong’ way, uphill from poor to rich countries. In this post we show […]
Keynesian economics emphasises the primacy of aggregate demand or expenditure in driving the growth of output and employment. More mainstream neoclassical Keynesians, and the New Keynesians, tend to argue that inadequate demand is a short run phenomenon. The more radical post-Keynesians argue that it can be a problem in the long run too.
To varying degrees, these economists make the case for demand management via some combination of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy. The more radically minded have also long argued for incomes policies to manage wage and price inflation, and reform to the international monetary system in order to allow national governments the space to manage demand and promote full employment while preventing excessive and destabilising current account imbalances.
While Keynesian economics focuses on demand and, traditionally, macroeconomics, industrial policy aims to impact more on the supply-side of the economy and draws on microeconomics. Continue reading →
Yanis Varoufakis is a self-styled ‘erratic Marxist’ and a former finance minister of Greece under the Syriza-led government. He penned his illuminating book The Global Minotaur (TGM) some years ago, in the aftermath of the evolving Global Financial Crisis.
He has become a prolific writer for the intelligent layman, and his website is well worth a look, particularly for those interested in progressive reform in the European Union and the Eurozone.
TGM is Varoufakis’ thesis on the roots of the crisis, which according to him lie back in the 1940s, towards the end of World War II. At that time, the US had emerged as the global capitalist hegemon, economically, politically and militarily.
The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire was attended by such figures as the economist John Maynard Keynes, who led the British delegation, and Harry Dexter White, his US counterpart. The aim was to construct a post-war global economic and financial order which would avoid another Great Depression, as had occurred in the 1930s, and the achievement of peace and prosperity via international cooperation. Continue reading →
“Self-restraint, as the philosophers know, is a rare and bewildering virtue. It is also a virtue that tends to come unstuck the more powerful we become. In this it resembles the relationship between trust and success: the stronger the bonds of trust between us, the greater our collective and individual success. But success breeds greed, and greed is a solvent of trust. Similarly with self-restraint: having it can help one succeed. But then success poses a threat to one’s self-restraint.”
Yanis Varoufakis (2015), The Global Minotaur – America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy (p.249)
This thought-provoking quote is taken from the postscript of Varoufakis‘s enlightening book on the roots and evolution of the Global Financial Crisis, originally published in 2011.
The author describes how post-war US hegemony produced a ‘Global Plan’ which helped to underpin a successful capitalism for twenty years; its ‘finest hour’, according to Varoufakis, and what has often been called the Golden Age. This gave way to his ‘Global Minotaur’ in the 1970s, which ultimately led us to the crisis of 2008 and its collapse.
The key that links these systemic ideas, and the possibility of a successful global capitalist future is what he calls the ‘global surplus recycling mechanism’ (GSRM). The evolution of the GSRM is the unifying theme which unites the book, which I will discuss in a future post.
Some of The Global Minotaur‘s ideas overlap with those of Michael Pettis, particularly in the latter’s book The Great Rebalancing. In fact the two are largely complementary, as Pettis describes the domestic policies in countries such as China and Germany, which helped to create the financial imbalances that caused the crisis.
This surplus, which means that Germany is lending its equivalent abroad, is equal to the excess of national saving over national investment.
It means that the rest of the world is running a current account deficit with Germany, since the sum of all the world’s current account surpluses and deficits is zero. If the rest of the world is running an overall deficit with Germany, this means that it is accumulating debt, funded by Germany lending its net savings, or the savings that are not invested domestically.
I have discussed these matters in previous posts, but the article cited above makes a useful point. The potential for reducing the German current account surplus is being played out as a conflict between economic and institutional forces. Continue reading →