Why US debt must continue to rise – Michael Pettis

Donald Trump’s signature policy of 2017, the so-called Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, cut taxes sharply for the richest earners and corporations. As so often in recent decades, many Republicans claimed that this would pay for itself via the increased revenue generated by faster economic growth, which would incorporate higher investment and higher wages for ordinary Americans. There would therefore be little need to cut spending to prevent the deficit from rising.

Such supply-side policies are part of the essence of ‘trickle-down’ economics, which boils down to the argument that making the richest members of society richer will make everyone richer, including those at the bottom. As with previous such policies, this remains to be seen, but the signs are not good.

On the other hand the US budget deficit is rising and is set to rise further. The national debt is also now growing faster than previously. While growth has been stimulated for a while, perhaps more from the demand-side than the supply-side, it seems that it is now slowing once more. This is a long way from the vaunted economic miracle from the President’s State of the Union address. Continue reading

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Tax, redistribution and economic performance: the micro and the macro

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the youngest woman ever to be elected to the US Congress, has made headlines recently with her arguments for much greater marginal rates of tax on the highest earners. Oxford University’s Simon Wren-Lewis yesterday posted this helpful piece on some of the economics and politics of such a policy. He is broadly in favour, and makes a good case for it.

Wren-Lewis is something of a New Keynesian, coming from the centre-left of mainstream thinking. The post covers plenty of ground, but tends to only focus on the microeconomics, while neglecting the macroeconomics, of higher taxes and redistribution. Continue reading

What is GDP in China? Thoughts on the slowdown from Michael Pettis

A fascinating piece from Michael Pettis, an economist I regularly reference, on how China is probably growing much more slowly than the official GDP figures make out, alongside a discussion of the nature and measurement of GDP itself.

This would confirm his long-held thesis that China’s ultra-high investment growth model has been unsustainable for some years, and will change of necessity, either through enlightened policy or, more painfully, in the absence of such a policy.

Trade tensions and rising protectionism are combining with the exhaustion of the recent economic upturn to slow growth in many countries.

The slowdown in China could lead to a ‘lost decade’ of relative economic stagnation there, until growth rebalances away from a significant share of unproductive investment and towards a higher share of consumption and a lower but more productive share of investment in overall demand.

Although the country is already economically powerful, its rise to global dominance could be much further away than many ‘China bulls’ have predicted. Even so, given its prominence in global manufacturing value chains, relative stagnation will have a large but uneven impact on global economic activity.

Chinese development – the end of the miracle?

800px-Chinese_draakThe Economist magazine has an interesting article this week questioning the sustainability of the Chinese growth model and drawing some parallels between it and the Soviet Union in the post-war period.

During the last 40 years, the rapid development of China has been perhaps the most extraordinary example of economic transformation in human history, both in speed and scale. The economy grew by around ten percent per year for three decades. Growth has in recent years begun to slow, but is apparently still humming along at more than six percent, a decent clip by any standard. Hundreds of millions of its population have escaped from poverty and the new ‘workshop of the world’ has flooded the world with cheaper goods.

But cracks have begun to show, particularly since the financial crisis of a decade ago. The Chinese government’s response to a collapse of exports was to ramp up lending from state-owned banks and embark on a massive spending spree on infrastructure. Continue reading