Mark Blyth – the top five books on how the world’s political economy works

Here is a compelling interview with political economist Mark Blyth, author of Austerity: the History of a Dangerous Idea, discussing his top five books on how the world’s political economy works. He includes works by Keynes, Polanyi, Hirschman and Moore.

I admit that of the five I have only read Keynes’ General Theory. I have also dipped into some of Albert Hirschman’s writings, though not these two. Even if you don’t plan to read them, the interview with Blyth is worth a look, as he summarises what he sees as the key insights from each of the five books.

Below is an excerpt from the beginning of the interview:

“Well…[the world’s political economy]…doesn’t work according to the textbooks. If you look at economic textbooks, the whole world is meant to work according to the logic of differential calculus; there are these reciprocal relationships – one side goes up and one side goes down. But deep within it there’s a paradox. On the one side you have Adam Smith, where everyone is pursuing their own self-interest leading to an outcome which is better than any of them could have intended. On the other, you have John Maynard Keynes. Today Keynes is thought of as someone who just talks about deficit spending and so on, but that’s just complete rubbish. Keynes’s central message is that individual rational action can be collectively disastrous. So, if you have a series of economic models in a text book where everything balances out, it’s much more attuned to the world working the way that Smith would like to tell us.”

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Wholes and parts: economics in the spirit of Keynes

A nice little post at the link below from Lars P. Syll quoting John Maynard Keynes on what he calls ‘organic unity’. Another way of putting it is that the whole can be more than the sum of its parts. This is the basis for the discipline of macroeconomics as distinct from microeconomics. Modern mainstream macroeconomics insists on ‘microfoundations’ and neglects the concept of organic wholes, which runs against the spirit of Keynes and his wish to establish a distinct macroeconomics.

Organic wholes can be seen as emergent from, but irreducible to their constituent and interacting parts. Thus while one can still pay attention to microfoundations (the parts), the behaviour of a larger whole can be very different from that deduced from simply adding the behaviour of the parts together.

In economics, the parts might be individuals, firms or households, while the larger wholes might be an economy at the national or global level. Of course, one could think of these concepts in ways which reach beyond the discipline of economics, which conflate wholes and parts and provide useful insights: an individual can be thought of as a ‘whole’ rather than a ‘part’, with the parts defined biologically, such as organs, cells etc, with the whole human being and its functioning as emergent from but irreducible to its constituent parts.

Returning to economics, a national economy can be analysed as a part of the global economy, leading to the possibility of certain macroeconomic paradoxes. So an economy can be seen as both a whole and a part, depending on how we look at it.

The unpopularity of the principle of organic unities shows very clearly how great is the danger of the assumption of unproved additive formulas. The fallacy, of which ignorance of organic unity is a particular instance, may perhaps be mathematically represented thus: suppose f(x) is the goodness of x and f(y) is the goodness of y. […]

via Additivity — a dangerous assumption — LARS P. SYLL

Keynes against capitalism

Crotty Keynes Against CapitalismJohn Maynard Keynes did not wish to merely save capitalism ‘from itself’ but to replace it with ‘Liberal Socialism’. That is the controversial claim made in a new book by the distinguished radical economist James Crotty, whose work ‘attempts to integrate the complementary analytical strengths of the Marxian and Keynesian traditions’.

The book, Keynes Against Capitalism, subtitled His Economic Case for Liberal Socialism, draws heavily on textual evidence found in the collected works of Keynes himself, from the 1920s through to the end of his life in 1946. This is both its strength and its weakness.

Without wishing to get into debate over semantics, one could find oneself agreeing with much of the argument ie that Keynes did in fact wish to replace capitalism with a radically different system called Liberal Socialism, but to say, in some ways, so what? The book is a fine scholarly read, but I found myself questioning whether Keynes’ (Crotty’s?) Liberal Socialism, for all its admirable socially transformative aims, would be both feasible and sustainable. Continue reading

Keynes and the conceptual cul-de-sac of General Equilibrium

Economist John Maynard Keynes

“The reasons for which Keynes’s arguments fail to translate into the orthodox paradigm are not because they are vague, confused or poorly formulated. They fail to translate, instead, because they identify and address crucial flaws in the structure and logic of the dominant paradigm. As Keynes himself put it, what he hoped to do is ‘convince [us] that Walras’ theory, and all others along those lines are little better than nonsense’. He was able to see, like Kornai, that the Walrasian ideal is ultimately ‘a special branch of mathematics’, which employs ‘logical reasoning [but] from arbitrary assumptions’, making it more an ‘intellectual experiment’ than a theory in the mould of the sciences.

The real problem which far too many economists have had with understanding Keynes’s arguments exactly as he expressed them is an intransigent desire to believe that, as once said by Debreu in an interview, ‘the superiority of the liberal economy is incontestable and can be mathematically demonstrated’. The problem with this conviction is that the economy that Debreu had in mind has little connection with reality. It is time, if we want in the future to avoid the terrible waste, not just of the past ten years, but of the many other times that liberal economies have so clearly failed to provide for full employment, that we turn our attention to understanding more accurately not the economic society in which we might wish to live but the one in which we actually live. It is in this regard that Keynes, read without the desire to adhere to the conventional wisdom of the Walrasian General Equilibrium paradigm, provides a truly valuable starting point.”

Mark Pernecky and Paul Wojick

Steve Keen – how economics became a cult

Post-Keynesian economist Steve Keen, of Debunking Economics fame, discusses in the video below his criticisms of mainstream economic thinking and his work constructing a model based on the work of Hyman Minsky, which necessarily incorporates money and finance.

The model can produce periods of economic stability with rising inequality, followed by instability and recession as possible outcomes. These patterns fit very well the experience of many rich countries during the last few decades.

He also touches on the dialectical thinking of Hegel and Marx, which he studied during his early career.

Keen was one of the heterodox or non-mainstream economists to use a mathematical model to predict a major economic crisis a number of years before the Great Recession of 2008 occurred, by modeling Minsky’s ‘financial instability hypothesis’.

Michael Hudson on John Maynard Keynes

Another in this occasional series from Michael Hudson’s excellent J is for Junk Economics:

“John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946): In the 1920s, Keynes became the major critic of World War I’s legacy of German reparations and Inter-Ally debts. Against the monetarist ideology that prices and incomes in debtor countries would fall by enough to enable them to pay virtually any level of debt, Keynes explained that there were structural limits to the ability to pay. Accusing Europe’s reparations and arms debts of exceeding these limits, Keynes provided the logic for writing down debts. His logic controverted the “hard money” austerity of Jacques Rueff and Bertil Ohlin, who claimed that all debts could be paid by squeezing a tax surplus out of the economy (mainly from labor).

Modern Germany has embraced this right-wing monetarist doctrine. Even in the 1920s, all its major political parties strived to pay the unpayably high foreign debt, bringing about economic and political collapse. The power of “sanctity of debt” morality proved stronger than the logic of Keynes and other economic realists.

In 1936, as the Great Depression spread throughout the world, Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money pointed out that Say’s Law had ceased to operate. Wages and profits were not being spent on new capital formation or employing labor, but were hoarded as savings. Keynes viewed saving simply as non-spending on goods and services, not as being used to pay down debts or lent out to increase the economy’s debt overhead. (Banks had stopped lending in the 1930s.) He also did not address the tendency for debts to grow exponentially in excess of the economy’s ability to carry the debt overhead.

It was left to Irving Fisher to address debt deflation, pointing to how debtors “saved” by paying down debts they had earlier run up. And it was mainly fringe groups such as Technocracy Inc. that emphasized the tendency for debts to grow exponentially in chronic excess of the economy’s ability to carry its financial overhead. Emphasis on debt has been left mainly to post-Keynesians, headed by Hyman Minsky and his successors such as Steve Keen and Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), grounded in Keynes’s explanation of money and credit as debt in his Treatise on Money (1930).”